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IF A RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE IS ARGUED IN THE SUPREME COURT, DOES ANYBODY 
HEAR IT? 
W. DAVID KOENINGER∗ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It would be difficult to conceive a vision of social equality that does not include 
access to health care. Access to health care is a cornerstone of social equality, a right of 
belonging1 that inheres in our citizenship. Unfortunately, that right has developed 
inconsistently in a health care system riddled with disparities. Following the enactment of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the “Affordable Care Act” or “the 
ACA”),2 activists and public health advocates had high hopes that those disparities could be 
addressed and begin to be remedied. To a certain extent, those hopes were placed in 
abeyance while the litigation challenging the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act 
worked its way up to the Supreme Court of the United States. But now, with the Court 
having upheld the Affordable Care Act in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. 
                                                          
∗ Senior Attorney, Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc., Toledo, Ohio. The author wishes to thank 
William Dailey and Eric Johnson for their terrific research assistance. 
1 See REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 6–8 (2006) (explaining that “rights of belonging” are “those rights that promote an 
inclusive vision of who belongs to the national community of the United States and that facilitate equal 
membership in that community. Legislation that defines and protects rights of belonging is the end product of 
a decision by the majority to embrace minorities and facilitate their inclusion in social and political 
institutions, as well as in the economic life of the country.”) More to the point, given the question: “Whither 
Social Equality?,” “rights of belonging are best understood as the set of entitlements that are necessary to 
ensure inclusion, participation, and equal membership in our diverse national community.” See id. at 6. 
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality 
Vol. 1, Issue 1 
115 
 
Sebelius,3 it seems appropriate to revisit those hopes and examine their continued vitality. 
The story of the federal government’s involvement in health care should be one of bringing 
the nation together to care for its own, but that story line is not yet the dominant one. 
Indeed, the Court’s awkward decision, upholding the individual mandate under the taxing 
power, and upholding the Medicaid expansion only as an option for states, suggests that the 
opposite is true.4 
Much of the debate leading up to and following the Supreme Court’s decision—
including the much publicized oral arguments—has dwelt in abstraction, several steps 
removed from the practical effects of health care legislation in general, and of the 
Affordable Care Act in particular. A casual follower of the ACA cases before the Supreme 
Court could have been excused for thinking that the two key issues presented were whether 
the federal government could control our grocery shopping lists and whether the states were 
being attacked by that same federal government. Very little media time was spent 
discussing the ACA supporters’ hopes for a reformed health care system or discussing the 
ACA’s potential impact in terms of lessening human suffering by enabling our society to 
develop better (and more cost-effective) ways to care for its members. This Article attempts 
to counter this state of affairs by placing health care reform in context—that is, within an 
                                                          
3 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Buss. v. Sebelius (NFIB v. Sebelius), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
4 See Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless Difficulties: 
Medicaid and Coercion in the Healthcare Cases (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 12–40, 
2012), http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/EndlessDifficulties.html (criticizing the 
Court’s spending power analysis of the Medicaid expansion). 




overarching narrative about Congressional attempts to address health care disparities—and 
to examine its practical effects and possibilities. 
To develop that context, this Article touches on some of the history of our federal 
government’s involvement in health care matters. The Article begins with post-Civil War 
Reconstruction and then moves forward to examine some of the major health care 
enactments of the last sixty-five years: the Hill-Burton Act,5 the Medicaid and Medicare 
statutes,6 the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”),7 and the 
Affordable Care Act.8 During the time leading up to the issuance of the Emancipation 
Proclamation, the federal government had done little to address the catastrophic health 
problems caused by the Civil War.9 These health problems became most obvious among, 
and were felt most acutely by, newly emancipated slaves who, without access to 
employment, also had no access to food, shelter, and clothing.10 Conditions became so dire 
that the federal government was forced to act. However, it did so in halting and, at times, 
ineffectual steps.11 In a very real sense, the federal government’s hesitant, incremental 
                                                          
5 Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act, § 600, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2006). 
6 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006). 
7 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act § 1867, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). 
8 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
9 JIM DOWNS, SICK FROM FREEDOM: AFRICAN-AMERICAN ILLNESS AND SUFFERING DURING THE CIVIL WAR 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 21–22 (2012). 
10 Id. at 22 (Oliver O. Howard, leader of the Freedman’s Bureau, described emancipation as “[m]any 
thousands of blacks of all ages, clad in rags, with no possessions except the nondescript bundles of all sizes 
which the adults carried on their backs . . . .”). 
11 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 151 (2002) (“The 
Freedman’s Bureau made heroic but limited efforts to remedy what can only be termed the post-emancipation 
crisis of health among the former slaves.”). 
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attempts to provide health care through the medical division of the Freedman’s Bureau 
seem all too familiar when considered alongside the last sixty-five years of attempts at 
federal regulation of health care in this country.12 
Because of the federal government’s ineffectiveness, freedpeople organized around 
the idea that access to health care was one of the rights that accompanied their newly-won 
citizenship.13 Indeed, all of the health care enactments discussed in this Article, at some 
level, can be considered incremental advances toward realizing the right to access health 
care that emancipated slaves believed was “embedded in the meaning of citizenship.”14 In 
particular, EMTALA gives individuals an explicit right to emergency medical treatment, 
regardless of ability to pay, by hospitals that participate in the Medicare program.15 
EMTALA is particularly fascinating because it reflects a national belief in a right to health 
care—the “embedded social norm”16 that we all are entitled at least to emergency medical 
care. 
                                                          
12 See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 436–50 (2011) (describing 
how two themes—“the deserving poor” and “states’ rights”—have limited the success of the Medicaid 
program). 
13 See DOWNS, supra note 9, at 154. 
14 Id. at 167. 
15 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). 
16 See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2611 (2012). (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (noting that “embedded social norms require hospitals and physicians 
to provide care when it is  most needed, regardless of ability to pay”). 




However, this legislative enactment, too, constitutes merely an incremental advance. 
EMTALA does not fund the cost of effectuating our deeply held societal norm.17 Thus, 
when uninsured persons receive emergency health care and cannot pay the bill, those who 
are insured help defray the costs to providers through cost sharing and higher premiums. 
Further, if the uninsured person is deemed to have been eligible for Medicaid, all taxpayers 
pay the cost in higher Medicaid expenditures.18 In such a system, it might seem obvious that 
broader access to health insurance would be a common and laudable goal, but that goal has 
remained elusive. There may be no better example of this than the Supreme Court’s ruling 
on the Medicaid expansion provision of the Affordable Care Act in NFIB v. Sebelius.19 
What was thought to be a broad expansion of access to health care that would ameliorate 
the effects of other half measures, such as EMTALA, has been transformed into yet another 
increment or half measure, thanks to the Supreme Court. 
Part I of this Article reviews some of the history of the federal government’s 
involvement in the health care of American citizens, beginning with post-Civil War 
Reconstruction and moving forward through some of our country’s post-World War II 
federal legislative attempts to address particular disparities in our health care system. 
                                                          
17 Indeed, the ACA’s individual mandate helps to create a funding stream to cover the requirements of 
EMTALA. See Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged Constitution of American 
Healthcare, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 222 (2012) (noting that the drafters of the Affordable Care Act 
might have been more accurate if they had called the minimum coverage requirement an “EMTALA risk 
adjustment payment”). 
18 See John C. Moskop, Nonurgent Care in the Emergency Department—Bane or Boon?, 12 VIRTUAL 
MENTOR 476, 477 (2010), http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2010/06/pdf/pfor1-1006.pdf. 
19 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–07. 
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Despite these attempts, two paths historically have defined access to health care in America: 
Americans either access health care through labor (that is, through employers) or through 
government programs aimed at those who can be classified as “dependent.” Part II 
discusses the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and how its individual mandate 
and Medicaid expansion fit within the context of other major federal health care legislation, 
particularly as a response to the consequences of EMTALA. Both provisions of the ACA 
operate to develop a third path of access to health care, one connected neither to 
employment nor to dependency. Finally, Part III addresses the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
NFIB v. Sebelius and its effects. 
The right to health care that went unheard by the Supreme Court was the same right 
that freedpeople sought to win for themselves—a right to health care detached from either 
labor or state-defined dependency. Indeed, this particular aspect of the Medicaid expansion 
seems to have doomed it in Justice Roberts’s eyes. Health care advocates always have 
anticipated that despite the enactment of the ACA, years of further reform will be needed.20 
The Supreme Court’s ruling adds new complexity to the consideration of further reforms.21 
As the ACA is implemented and those subsequent reforms are debated, the critical 
questions ought to be: will the reforms bring us closer to making access to health care a 
right of citizenship and, thus, will they enhance social equality? 
                                                          
20 See JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 5 (2011). 
21 See Sara Rosenbaum, A Closer Look at the Medicaid Holding in NFIB v. Sebelius: Key Implementation 
Questions, HEALTH REFORM GPS (July 3, 2012), http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/a-closer-look-at-
the-medicaid-holding-in-nfib-v-sebelius-key-implementation-questions/. 




I. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND HEALTH CARE: A HISTORY OF HALF-MEASURES 
Throughout our history, Congress generally has chosen not to exercise the full 
extent of its powers when regulating matters of health.22 For example, in its earliest days, 
Congress was reluctant to exercise its authority to enact a national health statute.23 
Specifically, it resisted President John Adams’s repeated requests to enact federal 
quarantine legislation for ports of entry to the United States.24 Instead, Congress passed 
legislation requiring the President to direct federal officials to aid in the execution of 
quarantine in accordance with state law.25 This reticence would continue until the massive 
displacement of large groups of people during the Civil War compelled Congress to act. 
A. The Civil War and Reconstruction 
During the Civil War, change born of necessity, not philosophy, finally came to 
Congress’ manner of addressing public health matters. “The emancipation of four million 
slaves called into question the function of these institutions [state and local governments, 
and benevolent and charitable organizations] and demanded an institutional response 
beyond these otherwise diffused local and state measures.”26 Though the Emancipation 
Proclamation was issued in 1863, Congress did not take steps to acknowledge and address 
                                                          
22 Ruger, supra note 17, at 224. 
23 Id. at 226. 
24 Id. Adams urged the Congress to “frame a [quarantine] system which, while it may tend to preserve the 
general health, may be compatible with the interests of commerce and the safety of revenue.” Id. at 226–27. 
25 An Act Relative to Quarantine, ch. 31, 1. Stat. 474 (1796), repealed by Act of Feb. 12, 1799, ch. 12. 
26 DOWNS, supra note 9, at 167. 
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some of the consequences of emancipation until 1865 when it established the Freedmen’s 
Bureau.27 
In his groundbreaking book, Sick From Freedom: African American Illness and 
Suffering During the Civil War and Reconstruction, Jim Downs describes the federal 
government’s intervention in health matters in the South and two of its critical aspects. 
First, “[t]he federal government’s obsession with freedpeople’s labor . . . circumscribed 
how freedpeople’s health would be defined and who would define it.”28 That is, the federal 
government’s primary interest in the health of freed slaves was linked to its desire to take 
advantage of their labor power,29 and those who were not able-bodied were forcibly 
separated from those who could work.30 Second, because of the federal government’s 
obsession with freedpeople’s labor, every aspect of its medical program in the South gave 
rise to anxiety that providing government health care to able-bodied individuals would 
render them dependent on the federal government.31 This anxiety was so pervasive that in 
the end, the constant pressure to reduce relief and medical aid “undermined the operations 
of the first-ever federal health care program.”32 
                                                          
27 See DOWNS, supra note 9, at 57–64. 
28 Id. at 64. 
29 Id. at 45. 
30 Id. at 46. 
31 Id. at 72. 
32 Id. at 73–74. Indeed, the congressional debates over the Freedman’s Bureau produced a curious tension that 
ultimately characterized the Bureau's work: a desire to help emancipated slaves mitigated by the longstanding 
congressional hesitancy to exercise full powers in health matters and by the concern that providing anything 
more than temporary assistance would engender dependence on the government among the emancipated. See 
id. 




These themes—both the emphasis on tailoring benefit programs to aid those who are 
not able-bodied or (as with children) are not able to work and the corrosive anxiety about 
creating government dependence by providing assistance to the able-bodied—recur 
throughout the history of the United States’ federal health care programs.33 Furthermore, the 
federal government’s halting response to the health care needs of freedpeople led to the 
development of black political activism around health care issues. Freed slaves became the 
first advocates of federal health care.34 Thus, tracing the federal government’s involvement 
in health care from Reconstruction forward to the present day illuminates some of the 
controversy surrounding the Affordable Care Act and can inform the debate about its 
provisions. 
In 1863, after President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, able-bodied 
freedmen generally joined the Union Army, leaving behind their families.35 Those women 
and children likely had only the clothes on their backs, no place to live, no source of food, 
and nothing to protect them from the elements.36 Moreover, the process of escaping from 
                                                          
33 See generally Huberfeld, supra note 12 (discussing the two themes of “the deserving poor” and “states’ 
rights”). Huberfeld locates the notion of the “deserving poor” within the tradition of the Elizabethan Poor 
Laws. See id. at 439. Downs’ work suggests that there is a long-standing racial component to the designation 
as well. See generally Downs, supra note 9. 
34 See Downs, supra note 9, at 167. 
35 See id. at 18–21. Black men who enlisted in the Union Army at Vicksburg, Mississippi, left behind more 
than 10,000 women and children. Id. at 26. 
36 Id. at 19. Those living in border states also ran the risk of being identified as fugitives by the Union Army, 
since the Emancipation Proclamation applied only to the rebelling states, and not to the states that remained 
within the Union. Id. at 18–19. 
Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality 
Vol. 1, Issue 1 
123 
 
the plantation, traveling for long periods to reach safety, and living without food, shelter, or 
clothing led to widespread sickness among freedpeople.37 
As the war continued, this problem worsened.38 Despite the efforts of a variety of 
entities—chiefly, the military and numerous charitable organizations39—direct federal 
intervention was required. Accordingly, in 1865 the federal government, in an 
unprecedented action, established the Freedmen’s Bureau and within that bureau, a medical 
division specifically tasked with addressing the health needs of freedpeople.40 The medical 
division established hospitals in the South to provide food, shelter, clothing, and basic 
medical care to freedpeople, marking the first time in U.S. history that federal officials were 
placed “in direct and intimate contact with the bodies of ordinary people.”41 The 
Freedmen’s Hospitals became the place for those who could not contribute to the labor 
force because they were sick, aged, or orphaned.42 The federal government, however, was 
not able to require that all of the established hospitals admit emancipated slaves.43 
Initially, Bureau leaders had expected that state-run hospitals in the South would 
accept freedpeople for treatment.44 Unfortunately, these leaders soon learned that local 
                                                          
37 See id. at 22. 
38 See id. at 25. 
39 See id. at 52–57. 
40 See id. at 62–64. 
41 Id. at 12. 
42 Id. at 63–64. 
43 Id. at 66. In some instances, doctors simply refused to touch sick black people. Id. at 35. 
44 Id. at 67. 




authorities would resist, arguing that they never had agreed to admit sick freedpeople,45 nor 
would other “charitable” institutions offer assistance. “Most almshouses refused admission 
to freedpeople because state and local governments failed to recognize newly emancipated 
slaves as citizens.”46 The same problem occurred when Bureau officials sought to have 
freedpeople admitted to state asylums and were refused, on some occasions in direct 
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.47 
It was not until an outbreak of smallpox in the autumn of 1866 that state officials in 
the South began to recognize black people as citizens entitled to quarantine along with 
whites in “pest homes.”48 At about the same time, freedpeople began to participate in 
politics and to insist that medical provisions be included in campaigns to win the benefits of 
citizenship, along with suffrage and public education.49 In this way, for freedpeople, “health 
became embedded in the meaning of citizenship.”50 Unfortunately, as with so many of the 
benefits of citizenship for freedpeople, a right of access to health care would go largely 
unrecognized until the 1960s.51 As Reconstruction came to an end, 
[S]ome state governments had assumed the responsibility for freedpeople's medical 
care, other freedpeople throughout the South continued to be denied support and 
admission to health facilities by local and state governments. Not having access to 
medical services during the Reconstruction period would, for a number of black 
                                                          
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 68. 
47 Id. at 150. 
48 Id. at 153. 
49 Id. at 154.  
50 Id. at 167.  
51 See infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
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Southerners, serve as the beginning of a system of discrimination that would only 
worsen in the 1880s and beyond.52 
 
 B. Hill-Burton 
Theodore Roosevelt, running to return to the presidency in 1912, was the first 
national politician of the 20th century to raise the issue of national health insurance.53 
Franklin Roosevelt later incorporated a right to adequate medical care in his “Second Bill of 
Rights.”54 Nevertheless, President Harry S. Truman was the first president to succeed in 
having any proposed health care reform legislation enacted into law.55 
The Hill-Burton Act, also known as the Hospital Survey and Construction Act, was 
signed into law in 1946.56 Hill-Burton was the first and only prong of President Truman’s 
three-pronged attempt to pass comprehensive health care reform that made it through 
Congress.57 Hill-Burton was intended to address the disparity in access to in-patient 
hospitals that existed in the country.58 The Act authorized matching federal grants for the 
construction of public and nonprofit private health facilities.59 Each state designated an 
                                                          
52 Id. at 155. 
53 Lee Igel, The History of Health Care as a Campaign Issue, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE J. 12, 12 (2008). 
54 PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 280 (1982) [hereinafter STARR, 
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION]. 
55 See id. at 280–83. 
56 Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act, Pub L. No. 79-725, § 600, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2006)). 
57 STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 281–83. 
58 See id. at 348–51. 
59 See id. 




agency to administer the program, survey the state’s health facility needs, and develop a 
state plan acceptable to the federal government, revising the plan every two years.60 
As with the Freedmen’s Bureau medical division, federal funds and resources were 
directed to the states, but state and local authorities retained ultimate control over their use. 
Indeed, Hill-Burton specifically avoided interfering in the practice of medicine in the 
states.61 In fact, in yet another instance of the federal government stepping back from the 
opportunity to regulate health care directly, the law left discretion in the siting of hospitals 
and the awarding of federal funds to state, rather than federal, entities.62 
Predictably, the results produced by this national program administered by the states 
were less than uniform. Wealthier communities benefited more from the legislation due to 
the requirements that communities raise two-thirds of the construction costs on their own 
and show that the hospitals supported by federal grants would be financially viable.63 Thus, 
although Hill-Burton succeeded in equalizing hospital bed access across the country, within 
the states hospital construction funds went to fewer low-income communities.64 By 1971, 
the federal government had spent, through Hill-Burton, $3.7 billion developing a modern 
American hospital system, but not a system to which all Americans had access.65 
                                                          
60 § 611, 60 Stat. at 1041. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 350. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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Although Hill-Burton provided billions of dollars of federal funding to states to 
address the disparities in access to acute care, in-patient hospital facilities that existed 
across the country after World War II, the Act made no attempt to solve some of the access 
problems first experienced by freedpeople in the South.66 To the contrary, Hill-Burton 
enshrined the Jim Crow concept of “separate but equal” in a provision inserted by Senator 
Lister Hill of Alabama.67 The specific language stated that while facilities built with federal 
funds were to be available to all persons “without discrimination on account of race, creed 
or color, but an exception shall be made in cases where separate hospital facilities are 
provided for separate population groups, if the plan makes equitable provision on the basis 
of need for facilities and services of like quality for each such group.”68 
From 1947 until 1963, this language governed the construction and renovation of 
hospital facilities in the South. Finally, in 1963 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit ruled that Hill-Burton’s separate but equal provision was unconstitutional, 
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, thereby upholding the lower court’s ruling.69 
At almost the same time, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964.70 Then, in 
1965, President Johnson signed into law the legislation that created Medicare (which 
                                                          
66 Id. 
67 JOHN DITTMER, THE GOOD DOCTORS 18 (2009). 
68 § 622, 60 Stat. at 1043. 
69 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 
(1964). 
70 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 




covered hospital care and physician services provided to the elderly) and Medicaid (which 
covered medical care provided to welfare recipients) with both programs set to begin 
operating on July 1, 1966.71 This created an opportunity for activists to undo some of the 
problems wrought by Hill-Burton. 
Relying on the newly enacted anti-discrimination provisions of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimination by recipients of federal funds,72 activists 
called on the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to force Southern 
hospitals to desegregate before they could receive Medicare payments for the services they 
provided. After receiving hundreds of complaints documenting discrimination in Southern 
hospitals,73 HEW launched a drive to bring more than 9000 hospitals across the country into 
compliance with Title VI before the Medicare program went into effect on July 1, 1966.74 
Ultimately, most were cleared to receive Medicare funds by the deadline.75 
 C. Medicare and Medicaid 
The simplest way to think about Medicare and Medicaid is that Medicare is for older 
people (over age sixty-five), and that Medicaid is for poor people (depending on the 
                                                          
71 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1395 (2006)). 
72 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(2006)). 
73 DITTMER, supra note 67, at 134–35. 
74 Id. at 136. Still, HEW did not have the resources to investigate individual doctors’ offices. Id. Thus, some 
white doctors in the South maintained segregated waiting rooms into the 1970s. Id. 
75 Id. at 139. By the early 1970s, the Southern hospitals were the most integrated facilities in their 
communities. Id. 
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particular state’s definition of poverty).76 While the programs were being debated in 
Congress, it became popular to describe them as portions of a three-layer cake.77 The first 
layer was coverage of hospital care for the elderly (Medicare Part A).78 The second layer 
was coverage of out-patient care for the elderly (Medicare Part B).79 The third layer, added 
almost as an afterthought, was Medicaid—medical insurance for those dependent on 
government financial assistance, such as women and children deemed eligible for the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) cash-assistance welfare program and single, 
adult males eligible for either Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled or Aid to the 
Aged, Blind, or Disabled.80 Strikingly, this layered-cake image illustrates how the structure 
of these programs tracks the lines drawn by the Freedmen’s Bureau for the administration 
of its aid during Reconstruction. Given the presumed link between free labor and access to 
health care, Medicaid and Medicare clearly were designed to assist those who, by necessity 
or by definition, were dependent on the government and not for those otherwise considered 
to be able-bodied. 
While they remain among the most significant legislative accomplishments of the 
Johnson Administration, Medicaid and Medicare were far more limited when they first 
                                                          
76 See PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE OVER HEALTH CARE 
REFORM 46–47 (2011) [hereinafter STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION] (pointing out that because welfare 
eligibility standards differed among the states, it might be easier to qualify for Medicaid in a wealthier state 
like New York than in a comparatively poorer state like Mississippi). 
77 STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 369. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (2006); STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 369. 




came into being than they are now. These were programs designed to provide health care 
access to only narrow segments of the population, not to implement a broad right to health 
care implicit in citizenship. Since their enactment, they have been amended numerous 
times. Long before the enactment of the ACA, Medicaid eligibility for children and 
pregnant women had been unlinked from eligibility for cash welfare assistance.81 Early on, 
the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) benefit was added and 
then strengthened in later years to provide a broader range of services to children;82 during 
the Clinton administration, Medicaid was amended to allow states to cover more children at 
higher income levels;83 and, during the George W. Bush Administration, Medicaid was 
amended to allow states to amend their Medicaid plans to  expand eligibility while 
providing less comprehensive “benchmark coverage.”84 Similarly, Medicare has added Part 
C (managed care)85 and Part D (prescription drugs)86 to its first two original layers of the 
three-layer cake. 
The programs were, and continue to be, supported by different payment schemes, 
creating significant differences between them. The Medicaid Act offered states the option to 
                                                          
81 See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 302, 102 Stat. 683, 
750–54 (adding 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I), 1396a(l)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4601, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-166–167. 
82 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6403, 103 Stat. 2106, 2262–64; 
Child Health Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821, 921–30 (1968).  
83 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4901, 111 Stat. 251, 552–70 (enacting the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP)). 
84 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6044, 120 Stat. 88–92 (2006). 
85 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 4001–4006, 111 Stat. 251, 275–334. 
86 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 
117 Stat. 2066. 
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participate in a program of cooperative federalism designed to improve the health access 
and status of poor Americans.87 More specifically, the Act created an entitlement for states 
to receive federal funding for at least half of the costs of both health care services and the 
administration of the program itself.88 
Once more, though, the Medicaid program illustrates the federal government’s long-
standing reluctance to dictate health policy to the states—particularly when it comes to 
determining who is able-bodied or “at risk” of becoming dependent on the government. As 
a result of this deference, states were permitted to establish very different Medicaid 
eligibility levels.89 Even though, as an incentive to participate in the program, poorer states 
would qualify to receive funding at higher match rates than more prosperous states,90 those 
states with lower per-capita incomes tended to be more concerned with limiting dependence 
on the government.91 Thus, it became much easier to qualify for Medicaid in New York 
than in Mississippi.92 As a practical matter, then, despite Medicaid being targeted to help 
                                                          
87 See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 343–48 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006)). 
88 Huberfeld, supra note 12, at 447. 
89 See id. at 447–48; see also Annette B. Ramírez de Arellano & Sidney M. Wolfe, Unsettling Scores: A 
Ranking of State Medicaid Programs, PUB. CITIZENS HEALTH GRP. 15–17 (Apr. 2007), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/2007UnsettlingScores.pdf. 
90 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(a), 1396d(b) (2006). 
91 See STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 76, at 47 (noting that “states varied in their . . . willingness 
to cover others among the poor”). 
92 See id. at 47; see also STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 417 (noting that the “corridor” 
between private insurance and government-funded care “was especially wide in the states, many of them in 
the South, that severely restricted Medicaid eligibility”). 




the uninsured poor in the poorest states, deference to state control has rendered the 
Medicaid program less successful than otherwise it might be.93 
In contrast, Medicare was, and remains, almost wholly outside of state control. It is 
a freestanding program available to all who qualify for social security benefits and is 
administered by the federal government.94 It has never been associated with welfare 
programs.95 Medicare also always has had uniform national standards for eligibility and 
benefits.96 Medicare providers can charge higher rates than Medicaid providers.97 This, of 
course, has made Medicare far more attractive to providers than Medicaid.98 Thus, while 
some physicians were, and are, reluctant to participate in Medicaid, virtually every 
physician accepts Medicare.99 
 D. EMTALA: A Right to Health Care 
On April 7, 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA).100 COBRA is likely familiar to 
many of us because it contains the law that requires employers and insurance companies to 
make insurance coverage available to employees who left their job or would have lost 
                                                          
93 See STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 76, at 47. 
94 See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 54, at 369–70.  
95 See id. at 370. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See id. 
99 STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 76, at 48–49. 
100 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82, (1985). 
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coverage for some other reason.101 During the 2008 recession, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA)102 made COBRA premium support payments available for 
individuals who had lost their jobs.103 In addition to establishing the provisions for 
continuing insurance coverage, COBRA also contained the four pages of the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), which sought to put an end to 
“patient dumping.”104 
Patient dumping, “the refusal to treat an emergency patient, even though the hospital 
has the ability to do so, simply because the patient may not be able to pay,”105  arose in part 
as a consequence of the differing payment rates provided by Medicaid, Medicare, and 
private insurance. While patients with private insurance were most favored for treatment, 
the uninsured and Medicaid patients were likely to be transferred to other facilities 
whenever possible.106 In some instances, patient dumping also occurred as a manifestation 
                                                          
101 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161–1169 (2006). Specifically, the law amended the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to require the plan sponsor of each group health plan to provide that each 
qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage because of a qualifying event is entitled to elect continuation 
coverage. The law defines a qualifying event as: (1) the death of the covered employee; (2) the termination or 
reduction of hours of such employee's employment; (3) the divorce of the employee; (4) the covered employee 
becoming entitled to Medicare benefits; or (5) a dependent child ceasing to be a dependent child under the 
generally applicable requirements of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1163. 
102 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
103 Id. at 455–66. 
104 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, 100 Stat. at 164–67 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006)). 
105 See Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass’n, 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1304 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
106 Congress noted that patient dumping had become a more acute problem since the implementation of the 
Medicare prospective payment system in 1983. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-241 at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 726–27. The prospective payment system pays a predetermined sum to a hospital based on the 
“DRG” (diagnosis-related group) in which a patient’s particular condition falls. STARR, REMEDY AND 
REACTION, supra note 76, at 64. 




of race discrimination, with eligibility for Medicaid sometimes serving as a proxy for 
race.107 In this way, patient dumping was reminiscent of the problems freedpeople faced in 
obtaining access to hospitals, almshouses, and asylums. It also echoed the problems faced 
by individuals seeking treatment in the segregated South prior to the implementation of 
Medicare. Quite simply, after the incremental advances achieved through Hill-Burton, 
Medicare, and Medicaid, more was needed. 
EMTALA addressed this problem by requiring all hospitals that have Medicare 
provider agreements and an emergency department to provide medical care to anyone who 
comes to the emergency department without regard to their ability to pay for the care they 
receive.108 Via a series of well-litigated terms of art, EMTALA requires that all individuals 
(documented or undocumented) who come to the emergency department must be given a 
screening examination.109 If an emergency condition110 or active labor is discovered, the 
                                                          
107 See Cara A. Fauci, Racism and Health Care in America: Legal Responses to Racial Disparities in the 
Allocation of Kidneys, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 43 (2001); Christine A. Fedas, Jeffrey M. Alexander & 
Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Emergency Treatment Act: A Federal Response to Patient Dumping, 76 MASS. L. 
REV. 110, 110 (1991) (noting that many improperly transferred patients were minorities who were harmed by 
the delay in receiving treatment). 
108 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2006). 
109 Id. 
110 “Emergency medical condition” is defined as “a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms 
of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could 
reasonably be expected to result in . . .[inter alia] placing the health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy.” 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(e)(1)–(e)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
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hospital must “stabilize”111 the individual, even if stabilization means obtaining the 
assistance of on-call physician specialists outside the emergency department.112 
EMTALA is unusual in the landscape of American health care regulation because, 
within a narrow focus, it directly prescribes how medical professionals are to practice 
medicine. There is no deference to state control. When EMTALA became law, twenty-two 
states had some form of statute or regulation aimed at requiring hospitals to provide 
emergency care to patients in need of emergency medical treatment.113 Nevertheless, 
Congress chose not to defer to state efforts to address the problem, creating federal 
sanctions that could be enforced against non-compliant hospitals.114 Until Congress acted, 
nothing in federal law had prohibited hospital emergency rooms from transferring patients 
with no or less favored forms of insurance to county hospitals or other public institutions 
that would not or could not afford to refuse to see them. 
This is as close as our country has come to the right to health care that freedpeople 
believed was embedded in citizenship.115 While there is no right to health care enshrined in 
the U.S. Constitution, EMTALA does create a limited right to health care by requiring 
                                                          
111 To “stabilize” means “to assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of 
the condition is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility[.]”42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd(e)(3)(A) (2006). Thus, EMTALA did not prohibit transfers to other hospitals but sought to ensure 
the safety of patients during such transfers. “Transfer” is defined to include moving the patient to an outside 
facility or discharging him. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4) (2006). 
112 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d) (2006); See also Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 
1990) (stating that hospitals could not avoid the requirements of EMTALA by admitting the patient to the 
hospital before discharging her). 
113 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, pt. 3 at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726. 
114 Id. 
115 DOWNS, supra note 9, at 167. 




hospitals to provide emergency medical treatment. Hospitals that fail to comply with 
EMTALA’s requirements can be fined,116 sued by other hospitals who assert that they have 
suffered a financial loss as a result of patients having been dumped on them,117 or sued in 
tort by any individual who suffers harm as a result of the hospital’s failure to comply.118 
EMTALA does not provide a cause of action, however, against physicians.119 
Nevertheless, EMTALA remains another half-measure enacted by Congress. 
EMTALA was and always has been an unfunded mandate. It has been estimated that in 
2009, cost-shifting to cover care provided to uninsured patients added $1100 to the annual 
cost of a family policy.120 Thus, even as EMTALA provides a limited right of access to 
emergency care for all, it drives up the cost of access to care for those with private 
insurance.121 Furthermore, to the extent that it encourages Medicaid recipients to seek non-
emergency care at hospital emergency departments, it increases the costs of Medicaid.122 
II. FILLING IN THE GAPS: THE ACA 
                                                          
116 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1). 
117 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B). 
118 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A). 
119 Still, physicians can be subject to civil monetary penalties. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B). 
120 Ben Furnas & Peter Harbage, The Cost Shift From the Uninsured: American Family Health Premiums 
Cost $1,100 More Because Our System Doesn’t Provide Continuous Coverage For All, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS 1 (2009), http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/cost_shift.pdf. 
121 See id. 
122 See Ohio Health Care Leaders Work to Reduce Avoidable Emergency Department Visits, OHIO DEP’T OF 
JOB AND FAMILY SERVS. (Apr. 27, 2010), http://jfs.ohio.gov/releases/pdf/042710ReducingERVisits.pdf 
(describing an Ohio program to reduce emergency department visits in order to save money for the state 
Medicaid agency); see also Phil Galewitz, Hospitals Seek More ER Patients Even as Medicaid Tries to Lessen 
Demand, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-08-
22/national/35271940_1_medicaid-patients-hospital-chain-medicaid-officials (reporting remarks of South 
Carolina Medicaid Director). 
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Many commentators have attempted to explain why the United States has had such a 
slow and difficult path toward health care reform and a national framework for funding and 
administering health care. Paul Starr refers to this problem as “the American health policy 
trap”: 
[A] system of employer-provided insurance that conceals its true costs from those 
who benefit from it; targeted government programs that protect groups such as the 
elderly and veterans, who are well organized and enjoy wide public sympathy and 
believe that, unlike other claimants, they have earned their benefits; and a financing 
system that has expanded and enriched the health-care industry, creating powerful 
interests averse to change.123 
 
In a similar vein, Theodore Ruger argues that it is the enduring American tradition 
of public concern about “institutional intrusion on individualistic choice in medical care”124 
that has so often contributed to opposition to health care reforms—both those generated by 
the government and those generated by the private sector. Arguably, both views simply 
incorporate vestiges of the Reconstruction-era issues identified by Downs: the odd-coupling 
of labor and health care and the ever-present anxiety about creating government 
dependence.125 
A. Labor, Health Care and Dependency 
During the Civil War era, some government officials believed that employment was 
the solution that would cure health problems.126 In the latter half of the twentieth century, 
                                                          
123 STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 76, at 123. 
124 Ruger, supra note 17, at 216. 
125 See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
126 DOWNS, supra note 9, at 27. 




this literally became government policy, as lucrative tax breaks were provided to employers 
who provided health insurance to their employees, and most citizens were able to access 
health care through employer-provided insurance.127 Unfortunately, the tax break given to 
those employers for providing health insurance to their employees allowed those employers 
to take on greater shares of health care costs than they might otherwise have done, 
insulating consumers from increases in the costs of services, which in turn drove up the cost 
of premiums for employers.128 
The enactment of the ACA was facilitated in part by a recessionary economy 
stripping away some of this insulation.129 Combining a recessionary economy with a rise in 
health care costs that outpaces the rate of inflation forces employers to shift those costs to 
employees, who cease to be completely insulated from the real costs of their care.130 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the fact that many unemployed Americans cannot 
afford their COBRA premiums for continuing coverage.131 
                                                          
127 See John Bronsteen et al., ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in the United States, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2297, 2297–302 (2008). 
128 See id. at 2301–02. 
129 See generally MCDONOUGH, supra note 20, at 50–99. 
130 Alex Nussbaum, Health-Care Costs Rise Faster than U.S. Inflation Rate, BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2012) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-21/health-care-costs-rise-faster-than-u-s-inflation-rate.html 
131 Indeed, part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) included subsidies 
provided to individuals to help them afford to pay the premiums for the continuing coverage made possible by 
COBRA. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6432 (West 2012). See also Cheryl Fish-Parcham, Getting Covered: 
Finding Health Insurance When You Lose Your Job, FAMILIES USA (2012) 
http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/getting-covered.pdf (urging individuals who cannot afford COBRA 
coverage to contact their Congressional representatives). 
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For those who could not work and therefore had no access to health insurance, 
government programs were crafted carefully to include only the neediest individuals and to 
exclude those who might be able-bodied. In the case of Medicaid, the peculiar American 
anxiety over government dependence led to the development of a program that clearly takes 
a backseat to Medicare, the program for which workers qualify upon retirement.132 
Moreover, by allowing individual states to set their own eligibility standards, the 
government allowed Medicaid access to differ significantly among the states.133 
Thus, as the policy trap implies, a few major reasons why individual choice in 
medical care is valued so highly may be that individuals know what their own benefits are, 
feel that they have earned them through their labor, and fear being forced into a non-labor 
related government program of inferior quality. The ACA guarantees that individuals will 
keep the insurance they have, and with good reason. Above all, in virtually every 
circumstance, individuals want the opportunity to opt in or opt out of an insurance program. 
The problem is that allowing that kind of choice in every circumstance makes for a terrible 
health care system. 
B. The ACA as a Response to the Trap 
                                                          
132 Medicare also is linked to labor in that one must work and pay into the Social Security system in order to 
qualify for it, and in that Medicare is primarily available to those who have reached retirement age. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1395–1395aaa (2006). Reflecting once more anxiety about creating dependency, Medicare is available to 
those who become disabled, but only after they have completed a two-year waiting period. 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1395–1395aaa (2006). 
133 See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 




The ACA establishes a federal commitment to promote a right to health care134—the 
kind of right that freedpeople thought was inherent in citizenship.135 It regulates private 
insurance markets so that individuals who work but do not receive health care through their 
employer can afford coverage.136 It expands eligibility for Medicaid.137 It requires all 
insurance programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, to provide the same essential health 
benefits, including covering preventive care.138 It expands Medicare Part D prescription 
coverage by eliminating the so-called “doughnut hole” in coverage.139 It prohibits all health 
care providers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, 
disability, or age.140 It also seeks to improve efficiency and cut costs in the delivery of care 
through innovations in the Medicare program.141 
In short, the ACA can be seen as an effort to fill in the gaps left in our health care 
system by all of the prior legislation justified by the coupling of labor and health care and 
the anxiety over creating government dependence. Quite intentionally, the ACA attempts to 
                                                          
134 Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 
1389 (2011). 
135 See supra text accompanying notes 49–51. 
136 See generally MCDONOUGH, supra note 20, at 118–33. 
137 See id. at 146. 
138 See id. at 112–14. 
139 For an in-depth explanation of how the doughnut hole is eliminated, see Richard L. Kaplan, Analyzing the 
Impact of the New Health Care Reform Legislation on Older Americans, 18 ELDER L.J. 213, 215-22 (2011). 
140 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.A § 300gg-5 (West 2012). 
141 See generally MCDONOUGH, supra note 20, at 156–64. 
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uncouple access to health care from labor142 and to make health insurance available to all 
without fear of creating dependence. 
Thus, rather than scorning or marginalizing government dependence, the ACA, by 
its very nature, encourages individuals to turn to the government, at both the state and 
federal levels, to provide access to health care. It also challenges the individual’s 
fundamental desire to opt out of the system by incentivizing individuals to stay in it.143 
Chiefly, this incentive is created through the individual mandate. Now that it has 
been upheld by the Supreme Court, the individual mandate, come January 1, 2014, will 
require everyone under sixty-five to have minimum coverage either through an expanded 
Medicaid program, employer-based insurance, or the purchase of insurance through a state-
operated insurance exchange. Lower-income persons who do not qualify for Medicaid will 
be entitled to receive subsidies distributed as advance tax credits.144 Those who opt out of 
                                                          
142 The ACA contains incentives for employers to continue to provide coverage to employees and establishes 
exchanges, such as the Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP exchanges) through which small 
businesses will be able to purchase insurance for their employees. However, it also ensures that insurance is 
readily available to those outside the labor market. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 18031 (West 2012) (describing the range of options available to states in setting up exchanges, 
including SHOP exchanges). 
143 The ACA amends 26 U.S.C. § 36B to make federal tax credits available to households with incomes 
between 133% and 400% of the federal poverty level so that they can buy insurance. Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act § 1401(a) (codified at 26 U.S.C. 36B(a), (c)). Those who do not find this incentive 
attractive enough will face the penalty for failing to obtain minimum coverage. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(b)(1), 
(g)(1) (2010). 
144 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(a), (c). 




the mandate will be required to pay a tax collected by the IRS with their income tax 
returns.145 
Through the mandate, Congress sought to relieve some of the upward pressure on 
health care prices and health insurance by spreading the costs of providing care to the 
uninsured over a much wider pool of policyholders. In this way, the ACA fills in a major 
gap in the current system. It solves the unfunded mandate problem of EMTALA by finding 
a funding stream. 
As originally written, the ACA included an expansion of Medicaid that was 
intended to change the character of the program by making Medicaid available to single, 
able-bodied adults for the first time. Beginning January 1, 2014, any citizen or legal 
resident in a state that adopts the expansion will be eligible for Medicaid if his or her 
income is less than 133% of the federal poverty level. It has been estimated that this 
expansion will cut state spending on uncompensated care for the uninsured in half, saving 
in the aggregate from $26 billion to $52 billion, and will reduce state spending on 
individuals with mental illness, saving in the aggregate between $11 billion and $22 billion, 
during the time period from 2014–2019.146 A more recent study, conducted by the Urban 
Institute, Ohio State University, and the Health Policy Institute of Ohio, found that the state 
                                                          
145 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(b)(1), (g)(1). 
146 Matthew Buettgens, et al., Consider Savings as Well as Costs: State Governments Would Spend at Least 
$90 Billion Less with the ACA than Without it from 2014 to 2019, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. & URBAN 
INST. 1–2 (July 2011), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412361-consider-savings.pdf.  
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of Ohio alone could save $1.03 billion by adopting the now-optional ACA Medicaid 
expansion.147 
III. NFIB V. SEBELIUS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius148 surprised almost all 
observers.149 However, if proponents of the ACA thought their surprise victory would 
enable implementation to move forward smoothly to address some of the long-standing 
deficiencies of federal health care legislation—moving those programs beyond service 
refusals, inconsistencies among state programs, the labor-health care link, and anxiety about 
dependence on the government—they were wrong on almost every front. In his opinion, 
Justice Roberts takes each one of those issues and all but flings it back in the face of 
reformers. 
 A. The Individual Mandate 
Although the Court upheld the individual mandate and preserved the Medicaid 
expansion (albeit as a voluntary expansion), the rhetoric of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
closely matched the tone set by the Court’s conservative majority in oral argument. Thus, 
                                                          
147 Health Policy Inst. of Ohio, The Ohio State U., Urban Inst., Reg’l Econ. Models, Inc., Expanding 
Medicaid in Ohio: Preliminary Analysis of Likely Effects, GRIPELEMENTS, 24 (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://a5e8c023c8899218225edfa4b02e4d9734e01a28.gripelements.com/pdf/publications/oh_medicaid_expan
sion_study_1_15_2013_final_numbered.pdf. 
148 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
149 Other than one Vanderbilt law professor, no one seems to have accurately predicted the outcome of the 
case. See Outliers Asides and Insides, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 16, 2012, at 36; see also Alyssa Creamer, 
James Blumstein, Vanderbilt University Law Professor, Has Medicaid Mandate Challenge Brief Cited in 
Supreme Court Ruling on Affordable Care Act, THE HUFFINGTON POST (July 5, 2012, 4:14 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/05/james-blumstein-vanderbilt-health-care-law_n_1651919.html. 




for example, the Roberts opinion150 echoes Justice Anthony Kennedy’s questioning and 
concerns. At oral argument, Kennedy posed the now oft-repeated question: 
I understand that we must presume laws are constitutional, but, even so, when you 
are changing the relation of the individual to the government in this, what we can 
stipulate is, I think, a unique way, do you not have a heavy burden of justification to 
show authorization under the Constitution?151 
 
In his opinion, Roberts referenced this language finding that the government had not met 
this burden of justification and that the individual mandate could not be justified under the 
commerce power.152 
Yet, given the federal government’s history of regulatory attempts in the field of 
health care, this seems to be the wrong issue on which to focus. It would be more accurate 
to say that the focus of the ACA itself, and the individual mandate in particular, is to change 
the relationships between individuals, not solely or even primarily the relationship between 
the individual and the government. If access to health care may be seen as an attribute of 
citizenship, should not the government play the leading role in effectuating that promise? 
Moreover, should the choices of individuals be permitted to infringe or define the rights of 
citizenship for others? When we have a health care system that allows free riders to opt out 
or that excludes large numbers of people, the inevitable costs become unsustainable.153 
                                                          
150 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2589. 
151 Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (No. 11-398). 
152 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2589. 
153 See Ruger, supra note 17, at 216. 
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While upholding the individual mandate, Justice Roberts’s language, invoking 
Justice Kennedy’s now-famous question, suggests that the rights of individuals are more 
highly valued than having a coherent, sustainable system that benefits everyone. Thus, the 
Roberts opinion likely will embolden those seeking to opt out of other aspects of the ACA. 
Many Catholic organizations already have filed suit seeking an exemption from the ACA’s 
requirement that the health insurance benefits they provide to employees include coverage 
for birth control.154 In another case, a federal judge in Colorado has held preliminarily that 
the same ACA requirement cannot be applied to a small business owned by a devout 
Catholic owner.155 
It is hard to predict where these types of cases will end or the effect they will have 
on implementation of the ACA. The examples above involve businesses opting out of 
insurance requirements.156 However, other opt-outs are possible as well. Providers may 
refuse to provide certain services to patients based on personal, moral, or religious 
objections.157 Patient dumping, of course, is a type of refusal, and EMTALA was enacted to 
prevent hospitals from opting out of providing emergency treatment to all, regardless of 
race or ability to pay.158 While supporters of refusal clauses and other restrictions view 
                                                          
154 See,e.g., Complaint at 1, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Sebelius, Case No. 1:12-cv-00815 
(D.D.C. May 21, 2012). 
155 Newland v. Sebelius, Case No. 1:12-cv-1123-JLK, 2012 WL 3069154 (D. Colo. July 27, 2012). 
156 See generally id.; Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash., Case No. 1:12-cv-00815. 
157 See Susan Berke Fogel & Tracy A. Weitz, Health Care Refusals: Undermining Quality Care for Women, 
NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM 8–9, 66 (2010), 
http://www.healthlaw.org/images/stories/Health_Care_Refusals_Undermining_Quality_Care_for_Women.pdf. 
158 See Reynolds v. ME Gen. Health, 218 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2000). 




them as matters of providers’ rights of conscience, they can have significant negative 
consequences for women’s health and lead to poorer health outcomes.159 Again, the 
question is whether the interests of the individual trump our communal interest in taking 
care of each other. One could argue that what is at issue here is not socialism, but solidarity. 
B. The Medicaid Expansion 
If supporters of the ACA were unhappy with Justice Roberts’s rhetoric, but pleased 
with the Court’s ruling on the individual mandate, they could find no such solace in the 
Court’s ruling on the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Though the Medicaid expansion was 
deemed constitutional as long as it was made optional for each state,160 Justice Roberts’s 
ruling carries with it the potential to undo much of the good that the drafters of the 
expansion sought to achieve. Roberts, joined by six other Justices, held that the federal 
government could not link a state’s decision to implement the Medicaid expansion to 
continued funding for all Medicaid programs.161 In doing so, he found that the Medicaid 
expansion was not an addition to the old Medicaid program, but an entirely new program.162 
This, of course, is true in the sense that the Medicaid expansion represented an 
uncoupling of labor and health care. The expansion would have created near-uniform 
eligibility across the nation based on a single method of counting income and no more 
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categorical distinctions.163 Whether working or not, all individuals with family incomes 
below 133% of the federal poverty level would be eligible for benefits on an equal basis.164 
Essentially, Justice Roberts reverts to the Freedman’s Bureau model, holding that a program 
to help the indigent and disabled is one thing, but a program in which able-bodied persons 
can access health care is of a “shift in kind, not merely degree.”165 
The consequences of an optional Medicaid expansion program are unclear. It may 
be that the federal reimbursement rates—100% initially and then gradually declining to 
90%—will be too attractive to refuse, particularly in places where hospitals are currently 
providing large amounts of uncompensated care.166 Therefore, almost every state will be 
inclined to sign up. On the other hand, with some state governors vowing not to expand 
Medicaid in their states,167 it may simply be more of the same—the same disparities in 
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eligibility and coverage, the same stigma as being a program of last resort, and the same 
difference between New York and Mississippi. Above all, what certainly seems clear is that 
Justice Roberts has given states much more leverage with which to negotiate the terms of 
their expansion.168 Depending upon how the states use that leverage, there could be wide 
disparities among states and many, many more people remaining uninsured. 
CONCLUSION 
The debate over health care reform is and ought to be about how we propose to take 
care of each other. A statute like EMTALA brings to the fore one major area of national 
agreement in health care: the right to emergency medical care. Unfortunately, in doing so, 
the statute shines a bright light on the gaping holes in our path-dependent health care 
system, in which access to care, since Reconstruction, either has come through labor or 
through a government program for the dependent. The ACA will close many of these holes, 
but because of the Supreme Court’s Medicaid expansion decision in NFIB v. Sebelius, it 
will not do so as completely or as efficiently as it might have. In the end, the right to health 
care detached from labor or dependency sought by freedpeople as a benefit of citizenship, 
and which could have been enshrined in law through the Medicaid expansion, went unheard 
in the Supreme Court. 
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Still, the ACA portends real progress. It is true that the ACA does nothing explicit to 
rein in costs. However, it does a lot of things that will make us healthier in the long run, 
such as provide across-the-board access to preventive care and other essential health 
benefits.169 The ACA still will bring many more people into the system—though, thanks to 
the Supreme Court, not as many as might have been hoped. By bringing more people into 
the system, it makes health disparities a problem for all of us to address together and a 
bigger cost than the risk of dependency. If we are all in the system together, whether we can 
pay or not, then those of us who do pay have a lot of incentive to make sure that those who 
cannot pay get the best outcomes from the system as cheaply as possible. Bending the cost 
curve certainly will be a critical task for the future. Nevertheless, the ACA provides a 
reason to believe that, to paraphrase Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: the cost curve, like the arc 
of the moral universe, is long, but it bends toward justice.170 
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